Mixed in are tales of George Soros, which only confuses the plot line. Tvede gives considerable attention to famous traders, including the trading performance of economists who actually invested according to their theories. Additionally, Tvede doesn't explore the role of printed financial news in financial booms, only the role of printed paper money.
For example, Tulip mania in Holland during the 17th century predates paper money and central banks, but coincides with the first 'newspapers'. Finally, there is no discussion of agent based economic models or 'cycle generator' processes. For example, the opening chapters on Law is clearly triggered by a generational shift Louis XIV's debts must be paide by Louis XV's generation , but the role individual life cycles might play in economic cycles goes unexplored. For example, considerable attention is given Friedman's trilemma: a central bank can't do all three of the following: 1.
Maintaining exchange rates 2. Control price levels 3. Allow Free trade As Tvede describes Friedman's position, everyone wants free trade, including foreign exchange trading. This makes stable exchange rates impossible to maintain if a country is to defend its population from the hardships of an economic cycle's end provide soft landings.
From this, a trader can plan to short currencies with central banks who traditionally defend exchange rates. The exchange rate is 'P', The 'defending' central bankers are trying to hold this constant. At the same time, they are attempting to hold 'Q' constant, providing their population with a stable 'standard of living'. What they cannot control is 'MV', or the amount of capital that leaks out of the system in search of better investment opportunities. The rise of classical economics Chapter Cycle analysis time series analysis, data mining Chapters Non-computational efforts to unify classic and cyclic analysis Chapters 11 to 19 Computational economics: simulation, feedback, and chaos with a major digression regarding George Soros and currency trading.
Format: Hardcover. See both reviews. There's a problem loading this menu right now. Learn more about Amazon Prime. Get fast, free delivery with Amazon Prime. Back to top. Get to Know Us. Underneath the dedicated excitement of the late nineties we can find a deep sense of inevitability. I am hesitant to say fatality because that would be too beautiful of an ending. Unfortunately, dotcoms lacked suspense. Generation were nothing but ordinary people and there is perhaps no secret which needs to be revealed. There are no signs of despair, or hope. At best there is white-collar crime.
The dotcoms, filled with excitement over business opportunities, lacked sufficient conspiratorial energy. It is questionable whether the schemes were white-collar crime. There is a sense of cold cynicism about a gamble lost. No depth, only light. There was no thing as wrong doings.
These were invincible innovators, who sneered at rules. The key is, it all went so fast. It was over before the antagonists had any idea what they were doing. Approaching the magic year everything seemed so right. The dotcommers are still baffled. Claiming that everything would be different they were unaware of the historical reality that every revolution eats it own children. The unjust crisis without cause overwhelmed the heralds of virtual enterprise, with hardly anyone to blame.
Lawyers may have advised the dot. Class actions may be taken. More likely is the superficial and packaged experience, sensed as something uniquely exciting, the dotcom generation, worldwide, went through. Dotcom antagonists had history on their side. Opportunities could only multiply. So what went wrong? Until late there had been the widespread belief that the IT-sector could not be affected by economic downturns.
There would always be strong demand for technology products and services and after many decades of growth the tech industry simply could not imagine that it could be hit by a recession itself. Even Manuel Castells in his timely update after his thick Network Society trilogy called The Internet Galaxy, is not free of this dogma. And, as with all the daring enterprises, the business landscape is littered with the wreckage of unwarranted fantasies. Instead he neutralizes the term New Economy by lifting it to a general level of all economic sectors that introduce network technologies.
He abstains to electrify his readership with upbeat concepts.
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One thing Castells does not want is to upset technologists and business people. Facing the legitimacy crisis of governments Castells still sees the necessity of political representation and effective public policy. Castells did not travel to the edges of the Galaxy to explore possible limits of his own discourse.
For him, society equals network. There is no room to question possible limitations of the network as a metaphor and question its agenda. As for many techno-determinists, Castells declares history a one-way street, leaving no option to quit the network society. Within Internet theory, Manuel Castells represents the third wave researchers of pragmatic social scientists after the computer scientists and cyber- visionaries.
On the other hand, the current economic laws are still in place. Ever since the mid nineties financial markets are dictating the technology sector, not the other way round-and Castells is well aware of this fact. Technology in itself is no longer the driving force. In the society of risk, theory can no longer produce a fixed morale from a meta perspective.
But how dangerous is Castells? His adverse of both speculative thought and ironic negativism puts him in a somewhat difficult position. Like many academics Castells wants to be part of it all while safely covered by an insurance policy. A worthy position, but not very innovative. Providing the reader with an impressive overview of new research, unlike the accelerated Zeitgeist, the outcome of The Internet Galaxy cannot be other then modest.
However, these tempered thoughts do not really help us in understanding the wild fluctuations in the State of the Internet. No matter how much realism prevailed, dotcommania happened, and its history needs to be analyzed. A productive discourse is not mere talk. The creation of a compelling ideology is not just a matter of talent. The killer app is not just people but the collective ability to mobilize and direct the Network Spirit. There could only have been a dotcom doctrine because it had drawn jigsaw ideas from elsewhere and energized these different pieces towards the Future.
He is right in saying that the volatility is systemic. Despite the utopian work of coders, artists and activists, the Internet cannot easily be disassociated from the capitalist logic. For as long as you want to live in society, and this time and in this place, you will have to deal with the network society. The fight has just started over the terms and conditions under which a techno renaissance could unfold itself: free software, open source, copyleft, barter, free money, etc. The role of financial markets and large corporations in this process is a highly disputed-and yet unclear-one.
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If the trajectory from bubble to burst is not to be repeated, the Internet community at large need to quickly dream up alternative economic models, otherwise the VCs will, again, knock on the door. Michael Wolff was the creator of the best-selling NetGuide, one of the first books to introduce the Internet to the general public. Those of us in the industry want the world to think the best of us, Optimism is our bank account; fantasy is our product; press releases are our good name.
Early Internet entrepreneurs with a media and publishing background such as Rosetto and Wolf believed that technology would become a transparent and low-priced commodity. Revenue streams would come from marketing partnerships, advertisement, direct sales and most of all, content replication. Views diverted over the issue if consumers were willing to pay for content. So far Internet users would only pay for hardware, access and, to a certain level, for software. Neither models worked. Users were mistaken for customers.
Dotcoms became victim of their own speed religion. The hyper growth dogma and drive towards the dominance of a not yet existing e-commerce sector overshadowed the economic common sense, fuelled by the presumption of some big, very big, out there, an opportunity, as blank and beautiful as virgin, waiting to be snatched. A dotcom could be defined by its specific way of financing, not by its entrepreneurial approach or technology focus.
The domination of high-risk finance capital over the dotcom business model remains an uncontested truth. Dot companies were depending on capital markets, not on their customer base. Land, as in most aristocracies, is the measure. Not trade. Who has the resources to claim the most valuable property — occupy space through the promotion of brands, the building of name recognition, the creation of an identity — is the name of the game.
Conquer first, reap later. Unlike Michael Wolff with his investigate new journalism style, Kuo lacks the critical ambition and just wrote down what he experienced. The book tells the story from an employee perspective about the rise and rise and sudden fall of the retail portal Value America. Craig Winn, a rightwing Christian with political ambitions who already had gone through an earlier bankruptcy case with Dynasty Lighting, founded the retail portal in The basic idea behind Value America was to eliminate the middlemen and ship products directly from manufacturers to consumers.
The company was spending too much and a company coup ensued. The board of directors eventually booted Winn; a short time later, in August , it closed down. John A. Value America is a perfect example of a dotcom scheme which had the coward mentality of messing up, knowing that someone else will clean up later, as an underlying logic. Either a next round of VC money, investments of pension funds or institutional investors, banks, employees or day traders, somebody was going to bleed. Not from the profitability of e-commerce but from large sums of money that would change hands quickly, in a perfectly legal way, covered up by official auditing reports, way before the world would find out about the true nature of the New Economy.
The Internet is a tremendous force for change, but the industry chews up more folks then it blesses. Of those only a handful ever found anything of any worth.
Business Cycles: From John Law to the Internet Cycle - Lars Tvede - Google книги
A few thousand covered the cost of their trip. Most came back cold and penniless. Thousand froze to dead. Despite the hype, headlines, and hysteria, this was just a gold rush we were in, not a gold mine we found.
We might look like hip, chic, cutting-edge, new economy workers, but in fact, a lot of us were kin to those poor, freezing fools, who had staked everything on turning up a glittering of gold. The gold rush narrative reinterprets business as lottery. There were no concepts or decisions, just chance statistics. The right historical parallels would perhaps be tulipomania Amsterdam, , the South Sea bubble UK, or the Roaring Twenties before the stock market crash.
Compared to the Gold rush there was no hardship during Dotcommania. Long hours were voluntary and compensated by parties and stock options. Besides some social pressure to comply there was no physical endurance to speak of. All participants are still in an ecstatic mood and would go for it again, if they could. None of the dotcommers froze to dead. It was good fun. As the now famous quote of a boo. It was the best fun. London-based boo. Despite, or thanks to all the money boo. Hill and Knowlton did not know how to sell the story to the media. JP Morgan was not bringing in investors fast enough.
He now lives Zug, Switzerland.
Lars Tvede. We also experience the 'happy days' when our faith in the future becomes almost limitless, and when we forget that the tide will turn again. But do business cycles exist? What creates them? Is it mass psychology, or phenomena in the management of business?